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NAVIGATING THE COURSE OF RELATION 
BACK: KRUPSKI V. COSTA CROCIERE S.P.A. 
AND STANDARDIZING THE 
RELATION-BACK ANALYSIS 
Heather Zinkiewicz* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (“Rule 15” or the “Rule”) 
provides for liberal amendment of pleadings.1 Rule 15(c) is the 
source of the “relation back” doctrine, which allows plaintiffs to 
amend a timely filed complaint to add a new defendant after the 
statute of limitations has run.2 Relation back allows such an 
amendment to relate back to the time of the original filing, thereby 
satisfying the applicable statute of limitations.3 When a party amends 
a pleading to add a new party, Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) requires that the 
new party “knew or should have known that the action would have 
been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper 
party’s identity.”4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Krupski v. 
Costa Crociere S.p.A.5 to resolve tension among the circuits over 
Rule 15’s breadth and to clarify what constitutes a “mistake.”6 
 
 * J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science, University of 
California, San Diego, June 2008. A special thanks to Loyola Law School Professor Michael 
Waterstone and the staffers and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, especially 
Elena DeCoste Grieco and Jeff Payne. 
 1. See Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Procedure: The Name Game: When Is a Mistake a 
Mistake?—Parsing Rule 15 on the Relation-Back Doctrine of Amendments to Complaints, 37 
PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 326, 327 (2010). 
 2. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2010). “An amendment to 
a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment changes the 
party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 
15(c)(1)(C). 
 3. Mullenix, supra note 1, at 327. 
 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). 
 5. 130 S. Ct. 2485 (2010). 
 6. Id. at 2492; see, e.g., Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., LLC, 330 F. App’x 892, 895 
(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2485 (2010); Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 
458, 469–70 (4th Cir. 2007); Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 208 (3d Cir. 2006); Leonard 
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Before Krupski, some courts narrowly interpreted “mistake” so 
as to make amendment virtually impossible, while other courts 
disregarded the mistake requirement almost entirely.7 Some circuits 
held relation back was not allowed when an amending party knew 
the existence and the correct name of the proper party to be added 
before the statute of limitations expired because it constituted a 
deliberate choice not to name that party and thus was not a mistake.8 
The Supreme Court rejected this view in Krupski by holding that 
“relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the party to 
be added knew or should have known, not on the amending party’s 
knowledge or its timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading.”9 
Krupski clarifies when courts should allow parties to use relation 
back and “strengthen[s] the policy in favor of allowing liberal 
amendment of pleadings in order to resolve disputes on their 
merits.”10 Part II of this Comment provides the facts and procedural 
posture of Krupski. Part III describes the Supreme Court’s reasoning, 
including the analysis of whose knowledge is determinative and 
whether an amending party’s delay in amending the complaint is 
relevant. Part IV discusses the importance of the text and purpose of 
Rule 15, the immediate impacts of the opinion, and the questions that 
remain after Krupski. Part V concludes that Krupski standardizes the 
relation-back analysis by requiring courts to focus on the knowledge 
of the party to be added to the complaint. 
 
v. Parry, 219 F.3d 25, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2000); Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 918 
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 7. Howard Wasserman, Watching Cases No One Else Cares About, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 
21, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/04/watching-cases-no-one-
else-cares-about.html. Almost all federal courts agreed that relation back was proper for cases 
involving misnomers, such as misspelling the defendant’s name or other typographical errors. 
Mullenix, supra note 1, at 327. Some courts limited Rule 15(c) to misnomer cases, while other 
courts took a more liberal view and held that both mistakes of fact and law constituted a mistake. 
Id. Courts also differed regarding whether to consider the diligence of the amending party to 
determine the defendant’s correct identity. Id. 
 8. See Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2492. 
 9. Id. at 2490 (emphasis added). 
 10. In re Dwek, Nos. 07-11757, 09-18421, 09-40969, 2010 WL 3087474, at *3 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2010). 
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II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 21, 2007, plaintiff Wanda Krupski tripped over a 
cable and fractured her femur while aboard the cruise ship Costa 
Magica.11 Krupski’s cruise ticket stated it was the sole contract 
between each passenger and the carrier, and it included various 
requirements for obtaining damages for an injury suffered on board 
one of the carrier’s ships.12 The ticket defined the carrier and all other 
vessels “owned, chartered, operated, marketed, or provided” by the 
carrier as Italian corporation Costa Crociere S.p.A.13 The ticket 
extended the defenses, limitations, and exceptions that the carrier 
could invoke to all persons acting on behalf of the carrier or on 
whose behalf the carrier could act. This included Costa Cruise Lines 
N.V. (“Costa Cruise”), which was identified as the carrier’s sales and 
marketing agent and was also the issuer of the ticket and 
accompanying contract.14 The front of the ticket listed Costa Cruise’s 
address in Florida and stated “that an entity called ‘Costa Cruises’” 
was the first cruise line in the world to obtain a certain quality 
certification.15 
On July 2, 2007, Krupski’s counsel notified Costa Cruise of 
Krupski’s injury, and on July 9, 2007, the Costa Cruise claims 
administrator requested additional information from Krupski to assist 
with pre-litigation settlement negotiations.16 However, negotiations 
proved unsuccessful, and Krupski filed suit against Costa Cruise on 
February 1, 2008, three weeks before the one-year limitations period 
expired.17 The complaint alleged that Costa Cruise owned, operated, 
managed, supervised, and controlled the ship on which Krupski had 
 
 11. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2490. 
 12. Id. For example, the ticket required an injured person to submit written notice of the 
claim to the carrier or its authorized agent within 185 days after the date of injury, to file a lawsuit 
within one year after the injury, and to serve the lawsuit within 120 days after filing. Id. 
 13. Id. (citation omitted). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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injured herself.18 On February 4, 2008, Krupski served Costa 
Cruise.19 
Although Costa Cruise thrice asserted to Krupski that it was the 
wrong defendant,20 Krupski argued in her response to Costa Cruise’s 
motion for summary judgment that multiple sources of information 
led her to believe Costa Cruise was the responsible party.21 Krupski 
contended that her travel documents prominently identified Costa 
Cruise, Costa Cruise’s website listed Costa Cruise in Florida as the 
U.S. office for the Italian company Costa Crociere, and the Florida 
Department of State website listed Costa Cruise as the only Costa-
related company registered to do business in Florida.22 Furthermore, 
Krupski noted that Costa Cruise’s claims administrator responded to 
her claims notification without mentioning that Costa Cruise was not 
a proper party to the suit.23 Along with her response to Costa Cruise’s 
motion for summary judgment, Krupski moved to amend her 
complaint to add Costa Crociere as a defendant.24 
On July 2, 2008, the district court denied Costa Cruise’s motion 
for summary judgment without prejudice and granted Krupski leave 
to amend as long as she properly served Costa Crociere by 
September 16, 2008.25 Krupski complied with the deadline by filing 
an amended complaint on July 11, 2008, and serving Costa Crociere 
on August 21, 2008.26 Pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation, the 
district court dismissed Costa Cruise from the case.27 
 
 18. Id. The complaint named Costa Cruise as the defendant, even though Krupski’s ticket 
identified Costa Crociere as the carrier and Costa Cruise as the sales and marketing agent for 
Costa Crociere. See supra text accompanying notes 13–14. 
 19. Id. at 2491. 
 20. First, on February 25, 2008, Costa Cruise filed its answer and declared it was not the 
proper defendant since it was merely the North American sales and marketing agent for Costa 
Crociere, which was the actual carrier. Id. Second, on March 20, 2008, Costa Cruise listed in its 
corporate disclosure statement that Costa Crociere was an “interested party” who was concerned 
with the outcome of the case. Id. Third, on May 6, 2008, Costa Cruise moved for summary 
judgment and argued that Costa Crociere was the proper defendant. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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Costa Crociere, represented by the same counsel who had 
represented Costa Cruise, moved to dismiss the lawsuit as untimely 
because the amended complaint did not relate back to the original 
complaint under Rule 15(c).28 The district court agreed and 
concluded that Krupski had not made a mistake.29 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment for Costa Crociere for two reasons: (1) Krupski knew or 
should have known that Costa Crociere was the proper defendant 
because she retained her ticket and thus made a deliberate choice not 
to name Costa Crociere as a party; and (2) Krupski’s 133-day delay 
between when she filed her original complaint and when she sought 
leave to amend constituted undue delay.30 The Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case.31 
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary 
judgment to Costa Crociere and remanded for further proceedings.32 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., No. 08-60152-CIV, 2008 WL 7423654, at *6 (S.D. 
Fla. Oct. 21, 2008), aff’d, 330 Fed. App’x 892 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 
2485 (2010). The court relied on Eleventh Circuit precedent and explained that the word 
“mistake” should not be interpreted to mean “a deliberate decision not to sue a party whose 
identity the plaintiff knew from the outset.” Id. at *5. The court concluded Krupski knew of the 
proper defendant and did not make a mistake because Costa Cruise informed Krupski that Costa 
Crociere was the proper defendant several times, and Krupski delayed for several months before 
amending her complaint. Id. at *6. 
 30. Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., LLC, 330 F. App’x 892, 895 (11th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2485. In affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit did not rely 
on the information in Costa Cruise’s filings, but rather explained that Krupski’s passenger ticket, 
which she had given to her counsel shortly after her injury, contained the relevant information 
identifying Costa Crociere as the carrier. Id. 
 31. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2489. Justice Scalia joined the Court’s opinion except for its 
reliance on the Advisory Committee Notes (“the Notes”). Id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia did not believe that the Advisory Committee’s 
intentions had any effect on the Rule’s meaning; instead, he believed the text of the rule always 
controls. Id. at 2499. Justice Scalia’s view is not widely accepted. The Notes are viewed as 
having a closer connection to the text than ordinary legislative history because they consist of the 
words of the entire body that drafted a Federal Rule, of Civil Procedure whereas legislative 
history consists of committee reports and individual legislators’ statements. Howard Wasserman, 
Belated Thoughts on Relating Back, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 10, 2010, 8:00 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/06/belated-thoughts-on-relation-back.html. 
 32. Krupski, 387 F. App’x at 893. 
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III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by quoting Rule 
15(c)(1).33 It focused on Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii)’s requirement that the 
defendant “knew or should have known that the action would have 
been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper 
party’s identity.”34 The Court concluded that the text of Rule 
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) supported neither of the Eleventh Circuit’s reasons for 
denying relation back.35 
A.  The Prospective Defendant’s Knowledge Is Determinative 
The Court explained that the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly 
focused on Krupski’s knowledge.36 The Court clarified that the 
question was not whether Krupski knew or should have known that 
Costa Crociere was the proper defendant but whether Costa Crociere 
knew or should have known that it would have been named as a 
defendant if not for a mistake.37 The Rule refers to what the 
prospective defendant knew or should have known during the Rule 
4(m) period of 120 days after the complaint was filed, not what the 
plaintiff knew or should have known when the original complaint 
was filed.38 The plaintiff’s knowledge is relevant only if it affects the 
 
 33. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2493. Rule 15(c)(1) states: 
(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the 
date of the original pleading when: 
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back; 
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original 
pleading; or 
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a 
claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided 
by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by 
amendment: 
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending 
on the merits; and 
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought 
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1). 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). 
 35. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2493. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. Rule 4(m) regulates the time limit for service. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (“If a defendant is 
not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after 
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defendant’s understanding of whether the plaintiff made a mistake 
regarding the proper party’s identity.39 
If the plaintiff knows of a party’s existence, the plaintiff can still 
make a mistake regarding that party’s identity.40 A mistake is “[a]n 
error, misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.”41 
The reasonableness of the mistake is not at issue.42 Even if the 
plaintiff knows the correct defendant exists, the plaintiff may 
misunderstand the correct defendant’s status or role in the events 
giving rise to the claim and may mistakenly choose to sue an 
incorrect defendant.43 This deliberate but erroneous choice does not 
bar a finding that the plaintiff has satisfied Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).44 
To reach this conclusion, the Court distinguished Krupski from 
its prior decision in Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.45 In Nelson, Adams 
USA, Inc. (“Adams”) sought to amend its pleading to add a 
corporation’s sole shareholder as a party, fearing the corporation did 
not have sufficient funds to pay an award of attorney’s fees.46 The 
Court noted that the mistake clause of Rule 15(c) was not at issue in 
Nelson because Adams had not made a mistake; instead, Adams only 
moved to amend its pleading when it learned that the corporation 
was unable to pay the award.47 Distinguishing the facts in Krupski 
from the facts in Nelson, the Court asserted that Nelson’s holding is 
consistent with its understanding of Rule 15: if the failure to name 
the prospective defendant in the original complaint were the result of 
a fully informed decision instead of a mistake regarding the proper 
defendant’s identity, Rule 15 would not be satisfied.48 
According to the Court, Krupski’s complaint showed that she 
meant to sue the company that “‘owned, operated, managed, 
 
notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order 
that service be made within a specified time.”). 
 39. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2493–94. 
 40. Id. at 2494. 
 41. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1092 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 529 U.S. 460 (2000). 
 46. Id. at 462–63. 
 47. Id. at 467 n.1. 
 48. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2496. 
  
1204            LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1197 
 
supervised, and controlled’ the ship on which she was injured,” and 
the complaint indicated, albeit incorrectly, that Costa Cruise 
performed these duties.49 Thus, Costa Crociere should have known—
within the Rule 4(m) period—that Krupski had not named it as a 
defendant only because Krupski misunderstood which Costa entity 
controlled the ship.50 This was a mistake concerning the proper 
party’s identity.51 Additionally, Costa Crociere could not reasonably 
have thought Krupski was pursuing a winning strategy by suing a 
defendant that was legally unable to provide relief.52 
B.  The Plaintiff’s Delay in Amending a Complaint Is Irrelevant 
The Court proceeded to repudiate the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance 
on Krupski’s delay in seeking to amend her complaint. Rule 
15(c)(1)(C) includes the exclusive list of relation-back requirements, 
and the amending party’s diligence is not included.53 Furthermore, 
relation back is automatic once the Rule 15(c) requirements are 
satisfied; the court has no discretion.54 In contrast, Rule 15(a) gives 
the court discretion to grant a motion to amend a pleading to add a 
party or a claim.55 Undue delay may be considered as part of the 
court’s decision to grant leave to amend under Rule 15(a),56 but the 
plaintiff’s speed in moving to amend the complaint should not affect 
whether the amended complaint relates back.57 
A court can examine the plaintiff’s conduct during the Rule 
4(m) period, but only to the extent that conduct affected the 
 
 49. Id. at 2497 (citation omitted). Costa Crociere should have known it was the proper 
defendant because it was represented by the same counsel who represented Costa Cruise, and 
Costa Crociere and its counsel should have known that Costa Crociere, and not Costa Cruise, 
owned and controlled the ship on which Krupski was injured. Id. at 2491, 2497 (citations 
omitted). 
 50. Id. at 2497. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 2496. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1) (“A party may amend its pleading . . . .” (emphasis 
added)), with FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1) (“An amendment to a pleading relates back . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 56. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2496; Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“In the absence 
of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part 
of the movant, . . .  etc.—the leave sought should, as [Rule 15(a) requires], be ‘freely given.’”). 
 57. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2496. 
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prospective defendant’s understanding of whether a mistake was 
made regarding the proper party’s identity.58 The plaintiff’s post-
filing conduct is otherwise irrelevant.59 The Court rejected Costa 
Crociere’s argument that Rule 15(c) requires the plaintiff to move to 
amend the complaint or to file and serve an amended complaint 
within the Rule 4(m) period.60 The Court concluded Krupski’s 
conduct during the Rule 4(m) period suggested there was no reason 
other than a mistake that she failed to name Costa Crociere.61 
C.  Other Considerations 
The Court concluded its analysis by listing additional factors 
that it weighed in making its decision. First, the Court noted the 
similarity in Costa Cruise and Costa Crociere’s names constituted an 
“interrelationship and similarity” that should have heightened Costa 
Crociere’s suspicion of a mistake when Krupski named Costa Cruise 
in a complaint describing Costa Crociere’s activities.62 Second, Costa 
Crociere contributed to the confusion over the proper party for a 
lawsuit: the ticket advertised that “Costa Cruises” had achieved a 
quality certification but did not clarify whether “Costa Cruises” was 
Costa Cruise Lines, Costa Crociere, or another related Costa 
company.63 Finally, prior litigation had made Costa Crociere aware 
that the difference between Costa Cruise and Costa Crociere 
confused passengers.64 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Krupski followed the text and purpose of Rule 15(c) and broadly 
interpreted what constitutes a “mistake” concerning the proper 
party’s identity. The decision will immediately influence district 
 
 58. Id. at 2496–97. 
 59. Id. at 2497. 
 60. Id. at 2497 n.5. 
 61. Id. at 2498. 
 62. Id. “Crociera” even means “cruise” in Italian. Id. (citation omitted). 
 63. Id. (citation omitted). 
 64. Id.; see, e.g., Suppa v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A., No. 07-60526-CIV, 2007 WL 4287508, at 
*1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2007) (denying Costa Crociere’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint 
when the original complaint named Costa Cruise as a defendant because it was “simply 
inconceivable” that Costa Crociere was not on notice that it would have been named in the 
original complaint if not for a mistake). 
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court rulings on Rule 15(c) issues.65 Although it provides additional 
instruction on how courts should construe Rule 15(c) mistakes, 
uncertainty remains regarding how to determine what constitutes a 
mistake, how to address Doe defendants, and how failing to comply 
with a scheduling order affects relation back. 
A.  Following the Text and Purpose of Relation Back 
The Court held that the text of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requires 
focusing on the knowledge of the party to be added, not the 
amending party’s knowledge.66 There is no reference to the amending 
party’s knowledge in Rule 15(c) other than that the amending party 
made a mistake.67 The Rule specifically instructs that the party to be 
added must know or should have known that it would have been sued 
had there been no mistake.68 It is therefore logical that the Court 
concluded that the proper analysis must focus on the new party’s 
knowledge. 
The Court noted the plaintiff’s diligence in amending a pleading 
is not a Rule 15(c) requirement but left it unclear whether the 
plaintiff’s tardiness should be wholly irrelevant.69 Arguably, it is 
desirable for a plaintiff to amend a pleading quickly. Even if a 
potential defendant knows within 120 days after the filing of the 
complaint that it is a proper party, the potential defendant does not 
know if it will be sued. Uncertainty is undesirable, especially if the 
statute of limitations has expired. Eventually, potential defendants 
should be in repose and should not have to worry about being sued. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff’s delay in amending a pleading could 
represent a deliberate decision not to sue a proper defendant.70 
Krupski waited more than four months to act after learning Costa 
Cruise was not a proper defendant.71 Perhaps Krupski’s lack of action 
implied that her decision to sue Costa Cruise was not a mistake but a 
 
 65. John R. McLeod, Mandatory Relation Back: Krupski v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A., BROWN 
& JAMES (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.brownjames.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=277. 
 66. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2493; see FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C). 
 67. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C). 
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). 
 69. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2496. 
 70. Brief in Opposition at 21, Krupski, 130 S. Ct. 2485 (No. 09-337). 
 71. Id. 
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deliberate omission.72 Because one would logically expect a plaintiff 
to seek leave to amend immediately upon learning that he or she sued 
an incorrect defendant, it is unclear why the Court did not consider 
Krupski’s reasons for delaying. 
Instead of examining the reason for delay, the Court focused on 
the history and purpose of relation back. The Court noted that its 
Rule 15(c) analysis was consistent with relation back’s history and 
purpose.73 The Rule’s history suggests it was promulgated by the 
Supreme Court and approved by Congress to respond to mistakes 
involving the incorrect identification of the party whose conduct was 
described in the complaint.74 Additionally, the Court’s analysis is in 
harmony with the purpose of relation back because it balanced the 
defendant’s interests with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s 
penchant for resolution of disputes on their merits.75 A prospective 
defendant—at least one who knew or should have known he escaped 
suit during the limitations period only because the plaintiff did not 
understand his identity—does not have any interest in repose, and it 
would be unfair to let such a defendant escape the consequences.76 
The Court’s liberal interpretation, however, may have been too 
forgiving. The rejection of relation back is supported by a legal 
system premised on favoring laws over sympathies.77 Arguably, if 
the plaintiff does not follow procedural rules, he or she should not be 
able to avoid the consequences simply because the result is severe. 
Procedural rules lose effectiveness if courts refuse to apply them in 
order to avoid harsh outcomes. If the law requires dismissal, “pleas 
for liberality do not trump the law.”78 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2494. 
 74. In re IndyMac Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 2d 495, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) responded to a recurring problem in suits against the federal government and 
particularly relating to Social Security. See Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2494–95. After the statute of 
limitations ran, a person who had named an improper defendant in an otherwise timely lawsuit 
challenging the denial of Social Security benefits could not amend his or her complaint because 
the amended complaint would not relate back. Id. at 2495. “The Advisory Committee clearly 
meant [these types of] filings to qualify as mistakes under the Rule.” Id. 
 75. Id. at 2494. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Mullenix, supra note 1, at 328. 
 78. Brief for Respondent at 8, Krupski, 130 S. Ct. 2485 (No. 09-337). 
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Here, denying relation back would seem harsh, but Krupski 
arguably got herself into her predicament by failing to protect her 
own interests.79 In an adversarial court system, the plaintiff must 
ascertain who is liable for his or her injury before the statute of 
limitations ends.80 It appears that Krupski—or her attorney—read the 
ticket because Krupski attempted to comply with its provisions 
governing claims against the carrier.81 However, Krupski did not 
follow the provision identifying Costa Crociere as the carrier against 
which a claim should be brought.82 Instead, Krupski sued Costa 
Cruise, which the ticket identified as the carrier’s sales and 
marketing agent.83 Krupski’s counsel himself admitted that “under 
the plain language of the ticket, Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., clearly 
can’t be a carrier.”84 Failing to sue Costa Crociere may have been 
unwise and even foolish, but the circumstances suggest that 
Krupski’s “mistake” may have been a conscious and deliberate 
decision.85 
B.  Immediate Significant Impact 
Scholars already have lauded Krupski as a “welcome decision” 
that “eliminated a gloss on [Rule 15] that imposed additional, non-
textual burdens on the amending party and that inappropriately added 
to the complexity of the rule.”86 Rule 15(c) will now be easier to 
apply because relation back is compulsory once the Rule 15(c) 
requirements are satisfied.87 
 
 79. Id. at 20. 
 80. Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1997). If the plaintiff “later 
discovers another possible defendant, she may not, merely by invoking Rule 15(c), avoid the 
consequences of her earlier oversight.” Id. 
 81. Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at 13. Krupski gave notice of her claim within 185 
days of the injury, filed suit within one year, and filed in the proper venue. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 14. 
 86. E.g., Allan Ides, The Scope of Relation Back Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
15(c)(1)(C), LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, July 2010, at 5. 
 87. See McLeod, supra note 65. 
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Krupski’s holding considerably alters the relation-back analysis 
in both federal and state courts.88 For example, the Seventh and 
Eighth Circuits’ previous decisions—affirming denial of relation 
back under the abuse-of-discretion standard because of the plaintiff’s 
lack of diligence in seeking leave to amend the complaint to name 
the correct party—are effectively overruled since Krupski requires 
that amended complaints relate back to the earlier filing if Rule 15(c) 
is fulfilled.89 In addition, Krupski may affect state civil procedure.90 
Some state laws for amending pleadings include language nearly 
identical to Rule 15(c), so the reasoning in Krupski should be highly 
persuasive when state courts confront an issue similar to that in 
Krupski.91 
The decision is also important to the business community. For 
one, it clarifies the plaintiff’s responsibility to identify the correct 
corporate defendant.92 Krupski signifies the Court’s readiness to 
impute notice to an associated, similarly named corporation.93 A 
corporation will no longer be in repose when a plaintiff erroneously 
files suit against one of the corporation’s subsidiaries even after the 
statute of limitations period has ended.94 This likely affects how and 
when corporations can assert statute-of-limitations defenses.95 
C.  Uncertain Implications 
Although Krupski will have an immediate impact, its full 
significance is unknown. Questions remain regarding the relation-
 
 88. Erin McNeill, Supreme Court Holds That “Close Enough” Counts When Naming 
Parties to Suit, MARTINDALE.COM (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.martindale.com/litigation-
law/article_Sands-Anderson-PC_1111520.htm. 
 89. McLeod, supra note 65. 
 90. McNeill, supra note 88. 
 91. Id.; e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-6(iv) (2007) (“An amendment changing the party 
against whom a claim is asserted . . .  relates back to the date of the original pleading if . . . that 
party knew or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper 
party, the action would have been brought against that party.”). 
 92. Andrew E. Tauber, United States: Supreme Court Decision Alert—June 7, 2010, 
MONDAQ (June 15, 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=102428. 
 93. McNeill, supra note 88. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Andrew E. Tauber, Supreme Court Docket Report—January 15, 2010, MONDAQ (Jan. 
19, 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=92390. 
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back analysis in such areas as Doe defendants, scheduling orders, 
and the exact breadth of what constitutes a mistake. 
1.  Uncertainty Regarding How Broadly  
Mistake Will Be Interpreted 
With the Court’s adoption of a broad understanding of 
“mistake” as to a proper party’s identity, it is now uniformly 
considered a mistake when the plaintiff misunderstands crucial facts 
concerning a potential defendant’s identity.96 Courts will likely only 
deny relation back if the plaintiff failed to name a defendant after 
making a fully informed decision not to sue that defendant.97 The 
Court suggested that if it is completely illogical for the plaintiff not 
to sue a party, then the plaintiff’s failure to sue that party was a 
mistake.98 
It is unclear, however, how expansively courts will interpret 
“mistake.”99 Krupski suggests that a mistake may now include a 
situation in which the plaintiff does not know which of two distinct 
persons or entities is liable.100 Regardless of the word’s scope, 
plaintiffs must still follow the notice-and-prejudice element of Rule 
15(c)(1)(C)(i).101 Thus, if no connection exists between the proper but 
unnamed party and the improperly named party, the proper party will 
likely not have received the necessary notice to allow relation 
back.102 However, if the parties are related or similarly named 
entities, as they were in Krupski, there likely will be sufficient 
notice.103 The Court’s broad interpretation of “mistake” thus 
principally resulted in minimizing the importance of Rule 15’s 
mistake prong and increasing the significance of the notice-and-
prejudice element.104 
 
 96. Wasserman, supra note 31. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. The Court noted that Costa Crociere “articulated no strategy that it could reasonably 
have thought Krupski was pursuing in suing a defendant that was legally unable to provide 
relief.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2497 (2010). 
 99. Wasserman, supra note 31. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. The mistaken-identity problem commonly occurs when different corporate entities 
run separate parts of a business. McLeod, supra note 65. 
 104. See Wasserman, supra note 31. 
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Courts could extend Krupski’s logic to cases in which both 
notice is sufficient and the plaintiff adds a new defendant in addition 
to the one already named.105 Some courts, however, have already 
refused to extend Krupski this far. For example, in Venezia v. 12th & 
Division Properties, LLC,106 a Tennessee district court refused to use 
relation back to add new defendants who allegedly controlled and 
worked in concert with the initial defendants.107 The court held that 
the plaintiffs were not mistaken but were just unaware of the alleged 
extent of the new defendants’ involvement.108 The court explained, 
“In the Sixth Circuit, lack of knowledge pertaining to an intended 
defendant’s identity does not constitute a ‘mistake concerning the 
party’s identity’ within the meaning of Rule 15(c).”109 
2.  Uncertainty Regarding Doe Defendants 
The Krupski Court did not provide guidance for how to address 
Doe defendants.110 The prevailing view before Krupski was that 
relation back did not encompass Doe defendants because the plaintiff 
did not make a mistake in suing Doe but rather sued Doe because he 
or she did not know the defendant’s identity.111 This lack of 
knowledge was not considered a mistake.112 After Krupski, courts 
have continued to hold that lack of knowledge is not a mistake,113 but 
other courts may extend the Court’s broad understanding of 
“mistake” to include Doe defendants.114 Arguably, an identity 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. No. 3:09-cv-430, 2010 WL 3122787 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 6, 2010). 
 107. Id. at *4–5. 
 108. Id. at *5. 
 109. Id. at *4; see also Burdine v. Kaiser, No. 3:09CV1026, 2010 WL 2606257, at *2 (N.D. 
Ohio June 25, 2010) (“The Sixth Circuit . . . does not consider adding new parties as correcting 
mistaken identity under Rule 15(c). Even ‘[s]ubstituting a named defendant for a “John Doe” 
defendant is considered a change in parties’ and thus would not relate back.” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)). The Second and Fifth Circuits follow the same rule as the Sixth 
Circuit—that a lack of knowledge is not a mistake—and district courts in both the Second and 
Fifth Circuits have also upheld this rule post-Krupski. Dominguez v. City of New York, No. 10 
Civ. 2620(BMC), 2010 WL 3419677, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010); Trigo v. TDCJ-CID 
Officials, No. H-05-2012, 2010 WL 3359481, at *18 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2010). 
 110. Wasserman, supra note 31. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See supra notes 106–09. 
 114. Wasserman, supra note 31. 
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mistake may occur when the plaintiff sues a Doe defendant because 
the plaintiff has insufficient knowledge of the defendant’s true 
identity.115 As the Indiana district court in Smetzer v. Newton116 noted, 
the governance of Doe defendants “may have changed” as a result of 
Krupski.117 However, the Smetzer court did not apply Krupski 
because neither party discussed Krupski or its impact.118 Even with 
an identity mistake, the notice-and-prejudice element still applies to 
Doe defendants.119 
3.  Uncertainty Regarding Scheduling Orders 
Krupski also does not provide guidance on how failing to 
comply with a scheduling order affects relation back.120 A scheduling 
order was not at issue in Krupski because Krupski moved for leave to 
amend within the timeframe allowed by the district court’s 
scheduling order.121 If the plaintiff seeks leave to amend after the 
scheduling order’s allotted time, a defendant will have a stronger 
argument that the amended complaint should not relate back.122 In 
addition to timeliness, a judge should look at other factors, such as 
how long after the deadline the plaintiff moved to amend and 
whether the amended complaint will affect the trial date.123 
V.  CONCLUSION 
After Krupski, district courts must focus on the knowledge of 
the party to be added instead of the amending party’s knowledge 
when applying Rule 15(c). Furthermore, district judges now lack 
discretion to deny relation back if Rule 15(c) is satisfied, especially if 
the plaintiff complies with a scheduling order.124 The Court’s analysis 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. No. 1:10-CV-93-JVB, 2010 WL 3219135 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 13, 2010). 
 117. Id. at *10. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Nazerzadeh v. Harris Cnty., No. H-08-0499, 2010 WL 3817149, at *36 (S.D. Tex. 
Sept. 27, 2010) (dismissing claims against John Does one through ten because the Doe defendants 
did not receive timely notice of the lawsuit). 
 120. McLeod, supra note 65. 
 121. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2498 n.6 (2010). 
 122. McLeod, supra note 65. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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closely followed Rule 15, although arguably the plaintiff’s speed in 
moving to amend a complaint should have been relevant to the 
Court’s analysis, even though the Rule does not mention delay. The 
Court broadly interpreted what constitutes a mistake, but it is unclear 
how extensively courts will construe “mistake” going forward. It is 
possible that the Court’s liberal interpretation was too lenient 
because Krupski complied with some of the provisions listed in the 
ticket but not others, such as the provision that named Costa Crociere 
as the correct party to sue. Krupski will likely not be the Court’s final 
decision on relation back because questions remain, most notably 
regarding Doe defendants and scheduling orders. 
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